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Abstract
This paper presents a stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model in which fi-
nancial fragility in firm and household sectors evolves endogenously through
the interaction between real and financial sectors. Changes in firms’ and house-
holds’ financial practices produce long waves. The Hopf bifurcation theorem is
applied to clarify the conditions for the existence of limit cycles, and simula-
tions illustrate stable limit cycles. The long waves are characterized by periodic
economic crises following long expansions. Short cycles, generated by the inter-
action between effective demand and labor market dynamics, fluctuate around
the long waves.
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1. Introduction
Financial crisis hit the U.S and world economy in 2008. Giant financial
institutions have collapsed. Stock markets have tumbled, and exchange rates are
in turmoil. Governments and central banks around the world have responded
by implementing bailout plans for troubled financial institutions and cutting
interest rates to contain the financial panic, and expansionary fiscal packages are
being pushed through to prop up aggregate demand. Hyman Minsky’s Financial
Instability Hypothesis offers an interesting perspective on these developments,
1I would like to thank Peter Skott for his support. I greatly benefited from his guidance,
suggestions, and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also would like to thank James
Crotty, James Heintz, and participants in UMASS-New School Graduate Workshop 2008 for
their comments. Any errors remain mine. Email: sryoo@econs.umass.edu
Preprint submitted to Elsevier April 23, 2009
which came after a long period of financial deregulation, rapid securitization
and the development of a range of new financial instruments and markets.2
According to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, a capitalist economy
cannot lead to a sustained full employment equilibrium and serious business
cycles are unavoidable due to the unstable nature of the interaction between in-
vestment and finance (Minsky, 1986, 173). An initially robust financial system
is endogenously turned into a fragile system as a prolonged period of good years
induces firms and bankers to take riskier financial practices. During expan-
sions, an investment boom generates a profit boom but this induces investors
and banks to adopt more speculative financial arrangements. This is typically
reflected in rising debt finance, which eventually turns out to be unsustainable
because the rising debt changes cash flow relations and leads to various types
of financial distress. Minsky suggests that this kind of endogenous change in
financial fragility can generate debt-driven long expansions followed by deep
depressions (Minsky 1964, 1995). In Minsky’s theory of long waves, short cycles
fluctuate around the long waves produced by endogenous changes in financial
structure. Thus, the distinction between short cycles and long waves is an im-
portant characteristic of Minsky’s cycle theory.
In spite of difficulties inherent in the formalization of Minsky’s theories,
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis has inspired a number of researchers to
model the dynamic interaction between real and financial sectors. Taylor and
O’Connell (1985), Foley (1986), Semmler (1987), Jarsulic (1989), Delli Gatti and
Gallegati (1990), Skott (1994), Dutt (1995), Keen (1995) and Flaschel, Franke
and Semmler (1998, Ch.12) are early contributions. Recent studies include
Setterfield (2004), Nasica and Raybaut (2005), Lima and Meirelles (2007), and
Fazzari et al. (2008).
This paper presents a stock-flow consistent model where firms’ and house-
holds’ financial practices evolve endogenously through the interaction between
real and financial sectors. The interaction between changes in firms’ and house-
holds’ financial practices produces long waves. The resulting long waves are
characterized by periodic economic crises following long expansions. Short cy-
cles, generated by the interaction between effective demand and labor market
dynamics, fluctuate around the long waves.
Compared to the previous literature, this paper has three distinct features:
2Wray (2008), Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) and Crotty (2008), among others, provide per-
spectives on how shaky are the foundations of these ‘sophisticated’ developments in financial
markets.
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First, the model in this paper is stock-flow consistent.3 Financial stocks
are explicitly introduced and their implications for income and financial flows
are carefully modeled. In particular, unlike the previous studies listed above,
capital gains from holding stocks are not assumed away and enter the definition
of the rate of return on equity.4 The rate of return on equity defined in this
way provides a basis of households’ portfolio decision. Firms’ and households’
financial decisions jointly determine stock prices and the rate of return on equity
in equilibrium. Thus, stock markets receive a careful treatment in this model
and play a central role in producing cycles.
Second, this paper pays attention to both firms’ and households’ financial
decisions. Minsky’s own account of financial instability tends to privilege the
firm sector as a source of fragility.5 Most previous studies follow this tradition
and tend to neglect the role of households’ financial decisions in creating insta-
bility and cycles. Some of the previous studies, including Taylor and O’Connell
(1985), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990), and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler
(1998, Ch.12), do not suffer from this kind of limitation but analyze house-
holds’ portfolio decision as well. However, their neglect of the role of capital
gains in households’ portfolio decision makes it difficult to analyze the implica-
tion of households’ financial decisions and stock market behavior for instability
and cycles. In contrast to these models, the model in this paper analyzes both
households’ and firms’ financial decisions. Capital gains and stock markets are
considered explicitly in a stock-flow consistent framework. The interactions be-
tween households and firms turn out to be critical to the behavior of the system.
The model consists of two subsystems: firms’ debt dynamics and households’
portfolio dynamics. One interesting result of our analysis is that two stable
subsystems can be combined to produce instability and cycles in the whole sys-
tem (See section 3). Thus, the resulting instability and cycles are genuinely
attributed to the interaction between sectors rather than characteristics of one
particular sector.
Lastly, existing Minskian models do not distinguish long waves from short
3See Skott (1981), Godley and Cripps (1983) and Taylor (1985) for early introductions of
explicit stock-flow relations in a post-Keynesian / structuralist context. Simulation exercises
based on the stock-flow consistent framework have been flourishing since Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2).
4Empirically, the movements of capital gains explain most of cyclical movements of the
rate of return on equity.
5Minsky’s neglect of the household sector is explained by his observation that “[H]ousehold
debt-financing of consumption is almost always hedge financing.” (1982, p. 32) This position,
however, has been challenged by some Minskian explanations of the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
(e.g. Wray(2008) and Kregel (2008))
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cycles and the periodicity of cycles in those models is ambiguous. My model is
explicit in this matter. It produces two distinct cycles: long waves and short
cycles. Long waves are produced by the interaction between firms’ and house-
holds’ financial decisions, while short cycles are generated by the interaction
between effective demand and labor market dynamics. In this framework, Min-
sky’s financial instability hypothesis is seen as a basis of long waves.6 To the
best of my knowledge, my model is the first to integrate an analysis of Minskian
long waves with that of short cycles.
The analysis of the implications of financial behavior for instability and cy-
cles in this paper complements previous studies on financialization and finance-
led growth in Skott and Ryoo (2008) where the emphasis is on the effects of
changes in financial behavior on long-run steady growth path with little atten-
tion to questions of stability and fluctuations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a stock-flow
consistent model. Section 3 analyzes how the interaction between firms’ and
households’ financial practices produces long waves. Section 4 briefly introduces
a model of short cycles into the current context. Section 5 combines our model of
long waves with the short-cycle model and provides simulation results. Section
6, finally, offers some concluding remarks.
2. Model
This section presents a model. Firms make decisions concerning accumula-
tion, financing, and pricing/output; households make consumption and portfolio
decisions; banks accept deposits and make loans. It is assumed that there are
only two types of financial assets - equity and bank deposits - and banks are the
only financial institution. It is assumed that the available labor force grows at
a constant rate7 and long run growth is constrained by the availability of labor.
6Minsky’s two papers (Minsky, 1964, 1995) provide a strong support for this view. In these
two papers, Minsky argues that there exists a mechanism in a capitalist economy that gener-
ates a ‘long swing’: the “mechanism which has generated the long swings centers around the
cumulative changes in financial variables that take place over the long-swing expansions and
contractions.” (Minsky, 1964). “The more severe depressions of history occur after a period
of good economic performance, with only minor cycles disturbing a generally expanding econ-
omy.”(Minsky, 1995, p.85) During this long expansion, an initially robust financial structure
is transformed to a fragile structure.
7We assume that there is no technical progress but the model can easily accommodate
Harrod neutral technical progress
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2.1. Firms
2.1.1. The finance constraint
Firms have three sources of funds in our framework: profits, new issue of
equity and debt finance. Using these funds, firms make investments in real
capital, pay out dividends and make interest payments. Algebraically,
pI +Div + iM = Π+ vN˙ + M˙ (1)
where I, Π, Div, M , and N are real gross investment, gross profits, dividends,
bank loans and the number of shares, respectively. Bank loans carry the nominal
interest rate (i). p represents the price of investment goods as well as the general
price of output in this one-sector model. All shares are assumed to have the
same price v.8
We assume that firms’ dividend payout is determined as a constant fraction
of profits net of depreciation and real interest payments. The dividend payout
rate is denoted as 1¡ sf and, consequently, sf represents firms’ retention rate.
Thus, we have
Div = (1¡ sf )(Π¡ ±pK ¡ rM) (2)
where K and ± are real capital stock and the rate of depreciation of real capital.
r represents the real interest rate, r = i¡pˆ.9 Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) and
Dos Santos and Zezza (2007), among others, use the specification (2) regarding
firms’ retention policy.
New equity issue can be represented by the growth of the number of shares
(Nˆ) or by the share of investment financed by new issues denoted as x. Skott
(1989) and Foley and Taylor (2004) use the former and Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) the latter. Two measures, however, are related to each other in the
following manner.
vNNˆ = xpI (3)
Substituting (2) into (1), we get
pI ¡ ±pK = sf (Π¡ ±pK ¡ rM) + vNNˆ +M(Mˆ ¡ pˆ) (4)
Scaling by the value of capital stock (pK), we have
Kˆ ´ g = sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm) + x(g + ±) + m˙+ gm (5)
8A dot over a variable refers to a time derivative (y˙ = dy=dt).
9A hat over a variable is used to denote a growth rate of the variable, for instance, yˆ =
(1=y)(dy=dt)
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where ¼, u, and m is the profit share (¼ ´ ΠpY ), the utilization rate (u ´ YYF ,
YF is full capacity output) and the debt-capital ratio (m ´ MpK ). The technical
output/capital ratio, ¾ (´ YFK ), is assumed to be fixed. ± is the depreciation
rate. Equation (5) has a straightforward interpretation: firms’ investment (g)
is financed by three sources: retained earnings, sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm), new equity
issue, x(g + ±) and bank loans, m˙ + gm. Given this finance constraint, firms’
financial behavior is characterized by sf , x (or Nˆ) and m. Most theories treat
the rates of firms’ retention and equity issue as parameters and debt finance
as an accommodating variable (Skott 1989, Lavoie and Godley 2001-2002 and
Dos Santos and Zezza 2007). This paper assumes that the retention rate (sf ) is
exogenous as in the above literature but both the rate of equity issue (x or Nˆ)
and the leverage ratio m are endogenous. However, our way of treating equity
finance and debt finance is not symmetric.
Debt finance evolves through endogenous changes in firms’ and banks’ finan-
cial practices which are directly influenced by the relationship between firms’
profitability and leverage ratio (see section 2.1.2 below). With debt finance de-
termined in this way, equity finance (x) serves as a buffer in the sense that once
the other sources of finance ¡ the retention and debt finance policies ¡ and
investment plans are determined, equity issues fill the gap between the funds
needed for the investment plans and the funds available from retained earnings
and bank loans. In this regard, equity finance is seen as a pure residual of firms’
financing constraint. Formally, for a given set of parameters sf , ¾, ± and r, the
trajectories of endogenous variables g, ¼, u, m and m˙ determine the required
ratio of equity finance to gross investment:
x =
g ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)¡ m˙¡ gm
g + ±
(6)
The treatment of equity finance as a residual may appear to be unsatisfactory
from a point of view that emphasizes substantial difficulty involved in raising
capital in equity markets compared to the other methods of finance. However,
as Figure 1 shows, the degree of flexibility in issuing equities was historically
very large. This was even more prominent when there were significant stock
buybacks, i.e. the rate of net issue of equity was negative (x < 0). For instance,
the share of fixed investment financed by equity issues was nearly zero in 1982
but reached -42% in 1985. It then bounced back to a positive rate, 4.3% in
1991, and hit the historical low, -71.5% in 2007.
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Figure 1: The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment (1952-2007)
Notes: Net issues of nonfinancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonfinancial
corporate (gross) fixed investment
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.213 and Table F.102. Author’s calculation.
2.1.2. Endogenous changes in firms’ liability structure
Endogenous changes in firms’ liability structure, which are captured by
changes in firms’ debt-capital ratio (m), are central in this paper, and a Min-
skian perspective suggests that the debt-capital ratio evolves according to sus-
tained changes in firms’ profitability relative to their payment obligations on
debt. Changes in profitability that are perceived as highly temporary have only
limited effects on desired leverage. I, therefore, distinguish cyclical movements
in profitability from the trend in average profitability and assume that changes
in liability structure are determined as the trend of profitability.10
The perception of strong profitability relative to payment commitments dur-
ing good years, Minsky argues, induces bankers and businessmen to adopt riskier
financial practices which typically results in increases in the leverage ratio. Fol-
lowing Minsky’s idea (Minsky, 1982, 1986), I assume that changes in the ratio
of profit to debt service commitments drive changes in the debt structure. For-
mally,
m˙ = ¿
³ ½T
rm
´
; ¿ 0(¢) > 0 (7)
where ½T represents the trend rate of profit11and ¿ is an increasing function.
During a period of good years when the level of profit is sufficiently high com-
10See section 3.1 for more discussion.
11A definition of the trend rate of profit will be provided in section 3.
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pared to interest payment obligations, firms’ and bankers’ optimism, reinforced
by their success, tends to make them adopt riskier financial arrangements which
involve higher leverage ratios. Moreover, a high profit level compared to debt
servicing is typically associated with a low probability of default which helps
bankers maintain their optimism. The opposite is true when the ratio of profit to
interest payments is low. Firms’ failure to repay debt obligations - defaults and
bankruptcies in the firm sector - put financial institutions linked to those firms
in trouble as well. This situation, which is often manifested in a system-wide
credit crunch, tends to force firms and bankers to reduce firms’ indebtedness.
2.1.3. Accumulation
In general, capital accumulation is affected by several factors including prof-
itability, utilization, Tobin’s q, the level of internal cash flows, the real interest
rates and the debt ratio, but there is no consensus among theorists concerning
the sensitivity of firms’ accumulation behavior to changes in the various argu-
ments. This paper follows a Harrodian perspective in which capacity utilization
has foremost importance in firms’ accumulation behavior (Harrod, 1939). The
perspective assumes that firms have a desired rate of utilization. In the short
run, the actual rate of utilization may deviate from the desired rate since firms’
demand expectations are not always met and capital stocks slowly adjust. If
the actual rate exceeds the desired rate, firms will accelerate accumulation to
increase their productive capacity and if the actual rate is smaller than the de-
sired rate, they will slow down accumulation to reduce the undesired reserve of
excess productive capacity. However, in the long run, it is not reasonable to as-
sume that the actual rate can persistently deviate from the desired rate because
capital stocks can flexibly adjust to maintain the desired rate. This perspective
naturally distinguishes the short-run accumulation function from the long-run
accumulation function.12
A simple version of the long-run accumulation function can be written as
u = u¤ (8)
where u¤ is an exogenously given desired rate of utilization. (8) represents the
idea that in the long run, the utilization rate must be at what firms want it to
be and capital accumulation is perfectly elastic so as to maintain the desired
rate. The strict exogeneity of the desired rate in (8) may exaggerate reality
but tries to capture mild variations of the utilization rate in the long-run. For
12This Harrodian perspective is elaborated in Skott (1989, 2008a, 2008b) in greater detail.
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Figure 2: Capacity Utilization. U.S (1948-2008)
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
instance, Figure 2 (a) and (b) plot the rate of capacity utilization in the U.S. for
the industrial sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively. The Hodrick-
Prescott filtered series (dotted lines) are added to capture the long-run variations
in the utilization rate. The figures show that the degree of capacity utilization
is subject to significant short-run variations but exhibits only mild variations
around 80% in the long-run.
In this paper, we use the long run accumulation function (8) to analyze long
waves: as long as we are interested in cycles over a fairly long period of time,
the assumption that the actual utilization rate is on average at the desired rate
is a reasonable approximation.
For the analysis of short cycles, however, the accumulation function (8)
cannot be an appropriate specification because the deviation of the actual from
the desired rate normally occurs in the short run. Thus, we will use the following
specification (9) to describe accumulation behavior during a course of short
cycles in section 4.
Kˆ ´ g = Á(u); Á0(u)À 0; Á(u¤) = n (9)
The strong positive effect of utilization on accumulation in (9) embodies the
Harrodian accelerator principle and the function Á is configured so that the
desired rate of utilization is consistent with steady growth at a natural rate.13
13The specification (9) is clearly an oversimplification since it leaves out other determinants
of investment. For instance, it does not capture the direct impact of financial variables such
as cash flow and asset prices which are highly emphasized by Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986) and
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2.2. Banks
In the model, banks’ active role in shaping firms’ financial structure is rep-
resented by equation (7) which reflects both firms’ and banks’ behavior. For a
given profit-interest ratio, equation (7) determines the trajectory of the debt-
capital ratio m. At any moment, the amount of loans supplied to firms will
be M = mpK. I assume that neither households nor firms hold cash, the loan
and deposit rates are equal and there are no costs involved in banking. With
these assumptions, the amount of loans to the firm sector must equal the total
deposits of the household sector.
M =MH (10)
where MH represents households’ deposit holdings.
Banks set the nominal interest rate i, which is typically affected by inflation.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that banks effectively control the real interest
rate r.
2.3. Households
Households receive wage income, dividends in return for their stock holdings
and interest income. Thus, household real disposable income denoted as Y H is
given as: Y H = W+Div+rM
H
p .
Households hold stocks and deposits and household wealth is denoted as
NWH , where NWH = vN
H+MH
p . Based on their income and wealth, house-
holds make consumption and portfolio decisions. We adopt a conventional spec-
ification of consumption function. (e.g. Ando and Modigliani, 1963)
C = C(Y H ; NWH); CY H > 0 ; CNWH > 0 (11)
For simplification, we assume that the function takes a linear form. We then
have, after normalizing by capital stock and simple manipulations,
C
K
= c1[u¾ ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)] + c2q (12)
where u¾ ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm) is household income scaled by capital stock and
Tobin’s q captures household wealth. c1 and c2 are household propensities to
consume out of income and wealth.
Tobin (1969), as well as current New Keynesian economics (Fazzari et al.(1988) and Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), among others). However, equation (9) can be easily extended
to accommodate the effect of those variables without affecting major results of this study.
In fact, the effect of cash flow and Tobin’s q on accumulation, it can be shown, reinforces
the utilization effect on accumulation embodied in (9). The merit of simple specification in
equation (9) is that it shows the underlying mechanisms in a transparent way.
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In addition to consumption/saving decisions, households make portfolio de-
cisions. We denote the equity-deposit ratio as ®, where ® ´ vNH
MH
.
I assume that the composition of households’ portfolio is affected by their
views on stock market performance. Applying a Minskian hypothesis to house-
hold behavior, it is assumed that during good years, households tend to hold a
greater proportion of financial assets in the form of riskier assets. In our two-
asset framework, equity represents a risky asset and deposits a safe asset. Thus,
a rise in fragility during good years is captured by a rise in ®. We introduce
a new variable z to represent the degree of households’ optimism about stock
markets. We can normalize the variable z so that z = 0 corresponds to the state
where households’ perception of tranquility is neutral and there is no change
in ®. Given this framework, the evolution of ® is determined by an increasing
function of z.
®˙ = ³(z); ³(0) = 0; ³ 0(z) > 0 (13)
The next question is what determines households’ views about stock markets, z.
It is natural to assume that household portfolio decisions, the division of their
wealth into stocks and deposits, will be affected by the difference between the
rates of return on stocks and deposits.
Our specification of the process in which households form their views on
stock markets emphasizes historical elements in financial markets. Thus, the
past trajectories of rates of return on assets as well as those of ® matter in the
formation of z. As a crude approximation of this perception formation process,
the following exponential decay specification is introduced:
z =
Z t
¡1
exp [¡¸(t¡ º)]· (reº ¡ r; ®º) dº (14)
where re is the real rate of return on equity, ·re ´ @·(r
e¡r;®)
@re > 0 and ·® ´
@·(re¡r;®)
@® < 0. In expression (14), · (r
e
º ¡ r; ®º) represents the information
regarding the state of asset markets at time º. The higher the rate of return on
equity relative to the deposit rate of interest, the more optimistic households’
view on stock markets becomes (·re > 0). However, other things equal, a
higher proportion of their financial wealth in the form of stock holdings (high
®) tempers the desire of further increases in equity holdings, i.e. ·® < 0.
Information on asset markets at different times enters in the formation of
z with different weights. The term, exp [¡¸(t¡ º)], represents these weights,
implying that a more remote past receives a smaller weight in the formation of
households’ perception of tranquility. Thus, ¸ may be seen as the rate of loss
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of relevance or loss of memory of past events. The higher ¸, the more quickly
eroded is the relevance of past events.14
Differentiation of (14) with respect to t yields the following differential equa-
tion:
z˙ = · (re ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z (15)
Two dynamic equations (13) and (15),along with the equation describing the
evolution of firms’ liability structure, (7), are essential building blocks for our
model of long waves. To proceed, we need to see how the rate of return on
equity, re, is determined. re is defined as follows:
re ´ Div + Γ
vNH
=
(1¡ sf )(Π¡ ±pK ¡ rM) + (vˆ ¡ pˆ)vNH
vNH
(16)
where Γ is capital gains adjusted for inflation (Γ ´ (vˆ ¡ pˆ)vNH).
The rate of return on equity is determined by stock market equilibrium.
Stock market equilibrium requires that the number of shares supplied by firms
equals that of shares held by households, N = NH , which implies N˙ = N˙H in
terms of the change in the number of shares. Firms issue new shares whenever
retained earnings and bank loans fall short of the funds needed to carry their
investment plans. Thus firms’ finance constraint (1) implies that:
N˙ =
1
v
[pI +Div + iM ¡Π¡ M˙ ] (17)
Simple algebra shows that capital gains can be expressed as follows:
Γ = (vˆ ¡ pˆ)vNH = (®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ)vNH ¡ vN˙H (18)
14An alternative specification to (13) and (14) is possible. Consider the following specifica-
tion.
®˙ = ³(®¤ ¡ ®) (13a)
®¤ =
Z t
¡1
exp [¡¸(t¡ º)]·¯ (reº ¡ r) dº (14a)
where ·¯0(¢) > 0 and ®¤ is the desired equity-deposit ratio. (14a) tells us that households’
desired portfolio is determined by the trajectory of the difference between the rates of return
on equity and deposit. This desired ratio may not be instantaneously attained so that the
adjustment of the actual to the desired ratio takes time. (13a) represents this kind of lagged
adjustment of the actual equity-deposit ratio toward the desired ratio. In spite of different
interpretations, the two specifications, (13)-(14) and (13a)-(14a), are qualitatively similar. To
see this, let z ´ ®¤ ¡ ®. Then z˙ = ®˙¤ ¡ ®˙. Differentiating (14a) with respect to t, we have
®˙¤ = ·¯(re)¡ ¸®¤ = ·¯(re)¡ ¸(®+ z). Therefore, we can rewrite (13a) and (14a) to:
®˙ = ³(z) (13b)
z˙ = ·¯(re)¡ ¸®¡ ³(z)¡ ¸z (15a)
One may want to compare (13b)-(15a) with (13)-(15).
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(®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ)vNH represents the total increase in the real value of stock market
wealth15 but some of the increase is attributed to the increase in the number
of shares (= vN˙H). To get the measure of capital gains, the latter should be
deducted from the total increase.
Using N = NH , substituting (20) in (21) and plugging this result in (19),
we get the new expression for re:
re =
Π¡ iM + M˙ + (®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ)vNH ¡ pI
vNH
(19)
Normalizing by pK, we get the expression for re as a function of ¼, u, m, m˙, ®
and ®˙:
re =
¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm+ (1 + ®)[m˙+mÁ(u)] + ®˙m¡ Á(u)
®m
(20)
´ re(¼; u;m; ®; m˙; ®˙) (21)
Substituting this expression in the dynamic equation (15), we have:
z˙ = · [re(¼; u;m; ®; m˙; ®˙)¡ r; ®]¡ ¸z (22)
(22) shows that households’ views of tranquility are affected by a number of
variables and the relationship is complex. We consider several cases according
to the property of (22) in section 3.
2.4. Goods market equilibrium
The equilibrium condition for the goods market is that CK +
I
K =
Y
K , and the
definition of q implies that q = (1+®)m. Using these, the equilibrium condition
for the goods market can be written as:
c1[u¾ ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)] + c2(1 + ®)m+ Á(u) + ± = u¾ (23)
We take the profit share (¼) as endogenous and the equilibrium value of ¼ can
be found for given u, m and ®. Explicitly, we have:
¼ =
Á(u) + ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfu¾
(24)
´ ¼(u;m; ®) (25)
As u, m and ® evolve over time, the profit share changes as well. The Harrodian
investment function adopted in this paper emphasizes a high sensitivity of in-
vestment to changes in the utilization. Specifically, it assumes that investment
15Note that ®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ = vˆ + Nˆ ¡ pˆ.
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rises much faster than saving as the utilization rate changes. This Harrodian
assumption has an implication for the effect of changes in utilization on prof-
itability: utilization has a positive effect on the profit share and the magnitude
will be quantitatively large.16 The large effect of changes in utilization on the
profit share plays an important role in generating short cycles. (See section 4)
It is also readily seen that changes in the debt ratio and the equity-deposit
ratio positively affect the profit share. Increases in the debt ratio or the equity-
deposit ratio raise consumption demand though changes in disposable income
or wealth, thereby increases the profit share.17
3. Long Waves
This section shows how endogenous changes in firms’ and households’ finan-
cial practices generate long waves. Our model of long waves consists of two
subsystems: one describes changes in firms’ liability structure and the other
specifies changes in households’ portfolio composition. Section 3.1 analyzes the
evolution of firms’ liability structure, assuming households’ portfolio composi-
tion is frozen. Section 3.2 examines households’ portfolio dynamics, given the
assumption that firms’ liability structure does not change. Section 3.3 combines
two subsystems and shows how long waves emerge from the interaction between
two subsystems.
3.1. Long-Run Debt Dynamics
This section analyzes the long-run evolution of firms’ debt structure. For
convenience, I reproduce equation (7).
m˙ = ¿
³ ½T
rm
´
where ¿ 0(¢) > 0 (7)
Regarding the shape of ¿ in (7), Minsky’s discussion suggests that the prosperity
during tranquil years tends to induce firms and bankers to gradually raise the
leverage ratio; the rise in the leverage ratio, however, cannot sustain because
it worsens the profit/interest relation. Minsky points out that the financial
system is prone to crises as the ratio of profit to interest traverses a critical level
(Minsky, 1995). The resulting systemic crisis may prompt a rapid de-leveraging
process. To capture this idea, we assume that ¿ 0(¢) takes relatively small positive
values within a narrow bound when ½Trm is above a threshold level (good years),
16If
@(I=K)
@u
= Á0(u) > (1¡c1)¾+c1sf¼¾ = @(S=K)@u , then @¼@u =
Á0(u)¡(1¡c1)¾¡c1sf¼¾
c1sfu¾
> 0.
17 @¼
@m
=
c1sf r+c2(1+®)
c1sfu¾
> 0 and @¼
@®
= c2m
c1sfu¾
> 0
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whereas it takes relatively large negative values when ½Trm is below the threshold
level (bad years). When falling profit/interest ratio passes through the threshold
level, m˙ sharply falls reflecting a rapid del-everaging process. Thus, ¿ 0(¢) is likely
to be very large when ½Trm = ¿
¡1(0). Figure 3 reflects this assumption.
T
rm
?
m?
()? ?
1
(0)? ?
Figure 3: Debt-Capital Ratio and Profit-Interest Ratio
As briefly discussed in section 2.1.2, we use the trend rate of profit ½T as
a basis of the evolution of firms’ liability structure. Behind equation (7) is the
idea that firms’ liability structure evolves endogenously over time and that the
key determinant of the evolution is firms’ and banks’ perception of tranquility.
The level of firms’ profit relative to payment commitments on liabilities is an
indicator of firms’ performance and solvency status. Movements of the profit
rate in general include both trend and cyclical components. It seems reasonable
to assume that the long-run evolution of firms’ liability structure is primarily
determined by the trend of the profit rate rather than the current profit rate.18
The driving force of the short-run cyclical movements in the current profit
rate is changes in capacity utilization while the desired rate, u¤, provides a
good approximation of the long-run average of actual rates of utilization. Thus
setting the utilization rate at the desired rate, the short-run cyclical component
18This perspective is in line with Minsky’s statement that “[T]he inherited debt reflects
the history of the economy, which includes a period in the not too distant past in which the
economy did not do well. Acceptable liability structures are based on some margin of safety
so that expected cash flows, even in periods when the economy is not doing well, will cover
contractual debt payments”(Minsky, 1982, 65).
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in the profit rate is effectively eliminated, and we have
½T = ¼(u¤;m; ®)u¤¾
=
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sf
(26)
The trend rate of profit defined as (26) depends positively on the debt-capital
ratio m and the equity-deposit ratio ® (@½T@m > 0 and
@½T
@® > 0). The profit-
interest ratio, the key determinant of the liability structure, is written as
½T
rm
=
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfrm
(27)
(27) implies that for a given value of ®, the profit-interest ratio is uniquely
determined by the debt-capital ratio m. Minsky’s implicit assumption that a
rising debt ratio deteriorates the profit/commitment relation can be written as:
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c1sf± > 0 (28)
The average gross saving rate is typically greater than household marginal
propensity to save out of disposable income, and this condition ensures that (28)
will be met: if SY =
I
Y =
n+±
u¤¾ > (1¡ c1), then n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c1sf± > 0.
Thus, we assume that this condition is satisfied.19
Using (7) and (27), m˙ can be written as a function of m and ®.
m˙ = ¿
µ
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfrm
¶
´ F(m¡ ; ®+) (29)
(29), along with the condition (28), implies that for any value of ®, (i) F is
decreasing inm, (ii) there exists a unique value of the debt ratiom¤(®) such that
if m = m¤(®), m˙ = 0, and (iii) m¤(®) depends positively on ®, i.e. m¤0(®) > 0.
By setting m˙ to zero and solving for m, we obtain the algebraic expression for
m¤(®):
m¤(®) ´ n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u
¤¾ + c1sf±
[¿¡1(0)¡ 1]c1sfr ¡ c2(1 + ®) (30)
It is straightforward from properties (i), (ii) and (iii) that (assuming ® con-
stant) our dynamic specification of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis im-
plies that firms’ debt structure monotonically converges to a stable fixed point
m¤. The intuition is simple. When the actual debt ratio (m) is lower than
m¤(®), the corresponding profit-interest ratio is greater than the threshold level
19Otherwise, an increase in the debt ratio will raise the profit-interest ratio which leads to
a self-repelling process of debt ratio without any ceiling.
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at which the debt ratio does not change. This will induce firms to raise the
debt ratio. The same kind of event will happen as long as m < m¤(®): m will
eventually converge to m¤(®). The opposite will happen when the debt ratio is
greater than the critical level (m > m¤(®)).
Given assumption (28), a stable dynamics is inevitable in a one-dimensional
continuous time framework. Moving from continuous to discrete time frame-
work may change the picture so that firms’ debt dynamics alone can produce
long-run cyclical movements. In this paper, however, I explore another avenue
toward long waves by integrating firms’ debt dynamics into households’ portfolio
dynamics.
3.2. Household Portfolio Dynamics
The other subsystem of our model of long waves, which describes households’
portfolio dynamics, consists of two dynamic equations:
®˙ = ³(z) (13)
z˙ = · (re ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z (15)
Analogously to the analysis of firms’ debt dynamics, we are interested in the
long-run evolution of household portfolio decisions and, to simplify the analysis
abstracts from the effect of short-run variations in capacity utilization. The rate
of return on equity evaluated at u = u¤ equals
reju=u¤ = ½T (m;®)¡ ± ¡ rm+ (1 + ®)[F(m;®) +mn] + ³(z)m¡ n
®m
(31)
Given this expression for re, equation (15) becomes
z˙ = · (reju=u¤ ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z ´ G(m;®; z) (32)
(13), (29), and (32) constitute a three-dimensional dynamical system. To better
understand the mechanics of this three dimensional system, let us take a look
at the subsystem (13) and (32), assuming that m is fixed. By differentiating
(32) with respect to ® and z, the effects of ® and z on z˙ are given by:
G® = ·re
@re
@®
+ ·® S 0 (33)
Gz = ·re
@re
@z
¡ ¸ = ·re ³
0
®
¡ ¸ S 0 (34)
The effect of changes in ® on z, G® in (43), is decomposed into two parts. First,
changes in ® affect the rate of return on equity, which influences households’
17
views on stock markets, ·re @r
e
@® . The effect of an increase in ® on r
e, @r
e
@® , can
be negative or positive in the steady state. Second, an increase in ® mitigates
the desire for further increases in equity holdings (·® < 0). Thus, the overall
effect depends on the precise magnitude of these two effects.
The effect of z on z˙ is also unclear. On the one hand, an increase in house-
holds’ optimism about stock markets accelerates stock holdings, which raises
capital gains and the rate of return on equity. The increase in re reinforces
their optimism (·re @r
e
@z > 0). On the other hand, the degree of optimism will
erode at a speed of ¸, holding re and ® constant. Thus, the net effect is am-
biguous.
Let JH be the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed point of (39) and (42).
The ambiguity of the signs of G® and Gz yields four cases. Table 1 summarizes
it.
Table 1: Classifying Fixed Points
Gz < 0 Gz > 0
G® < 0
Case I Stable
Tr(JH) < 0 and Det(JH) > 0
Case II Unstable
Tr(JH) > 0 and Det(JH) > 0
G® > 0
Case III Saddle
Tr(JH) < 0 and Det(JH) < 0
Case IV Saddle
Tr(JH) > 0 and Det(JH) < 0
A locally stable steady state in the subsystem is obtained when Gz and G®
are both negative (Case I). In this case, ¸ is large relative to ·re @r
e
@z , and ·re
@re
@®
is negative or, if positive, relatively small compared to the absolute value of ·®.
Thus, to get a local stable steady state for households’ portfolio dynamics, the
positive effect of changes in ® and z on z˙ via the rate of return on equity needs
to remain relatively small in the neighborhood of the steady state.
Moving from Case I, as ¸ gets smaller than ·re @r
e
@z (Gz > 0), keeping the
condition G® < 0, the steady state becomes locally unstable, yielding Case II.
In this case, a high optimism further boosts households’ optimistic views on
stock markets, creating destabilizing forces. The locally unstable steady state,
along with nonlinearities of (13) and (32), can produce limit cycles as long as
¸ is not too small. Thus, in this case, households’ portfolio dynamics alone can
generate persistent long waves.
If G® > 0, i.e. ·re @r
e
@® is larger than j·®j, then the fixed point of the house-
holds’ portfolio dynamics becomes saddle, regardless of the sign of Gz (Case III
and IV). In both Case III and IV, a high level of equity holdings creates increas-
ing optimism (G® > 0), making the steady state a saddle point. However, Case
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IV is distinguished from Case III because it is an exceptional case: it turns out
that the destabilizing force in Case IV is too strong to produce a limit cycle for
the three dimensional full system ((13), (29), and (32)), whereas, in all other
three cases I, II, and III, an appropriate choice of parameter values can produce
a limit cycle for the full system. The next section analyzes the full system of
long waves.
3.3. Full Dynamics: Long Waves
We now put together firms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics and
obtain the following three dimensional dynamical system:
m˙ = F(m;®) (29)
®˙ = ³(z) (13)
z˙ = G(m;®; z) (32)
Let us first consider the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated in the steady
state.
J =
264Fm F® 00 0 ³ 0
Gm G® Gz
375 =
264¡ + 00 0 +
¡ +=¡ +=¡
375 (35)
G® and Gz are ambiguously signed but the partial derivative of G with respect
to m is likely to be negative:
Gm = ·re
@re
@m
(36)
where
@re
@m
=
h
@½T
@mm¡ ½T
i
+ (1 + ®)mFm + n+ ±
®m2
(37)
in the steady state. The sign of (37) may appear to be indeterminate: while
@½T
@mm ¡ ½T is negative due to assumption (28) and (1 + ®)mFm is negative
since Fm < 0, n + ± is positive. The discussion on the shape of ¿(¢) in section
3.1, however, suggests that Fm is large in magnitude at the steady state growth
path.20 Thus, at the steady state, the negative terms in the numerator in (37)
dominate, and the rate of return on equity will decrease as firms’ indebtedness
increases in the neighborhood of the steady state. Thus, we have Gm = ·re @r
e
@m <
0.
20If ¿ 0(¢) is large at ½T
rm
= ¿¡1(0), the derivative of F(m;®) with respect to m is strongly
negative at m = m¤(®), i.e. jFmj is large. In a limiting case where the de-leveraging process
is instantaneous at m¤(®), Fm ! ¡1.
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We are interested in the conditions under which the system exhibits limit
cycle behavior. As 3.1 and 3.2 showed, the specification of firms’ financial
decisions, (29), leads to asymptotically stable dynamics, whereas households’
portfolio dynamics ((13) and (32)) produces several cases in Table 1. Our an-
alytic result suggests that if households’ portfolio dynamics is neither strongly
stabilizing nor strongly destabilizing, our baseline system of (13), (29) and (32)
tends to generate limit cycles. Our analysis of limit cycles is based on the Hopf
bifurcation theorem. The Hopf bifurcation occurs if the nature of the system
experiences the transition from stable fixed point to stable cycle as we gradually
change a parameter value of a dynamical system (Medio, 1992, section 2.7). I
will use ¸ as the parameter for the analysis of bifurcation.21 Proposition 122
provides the main results of our analysis of long waves:
Proposition 1. Consider the three dimensional system of (12), (29) and (32)
and the Jacobian matrix (35) where the partial derivatives are taken at the steady
state values. Let
b ´ (jFmj
2 ¡ ³ 0G®)¡
p
(jFmj2 ¡ ³ 0G®)2 + 4³ 0jFmjjGmjF®
2jFmj < 0
(I) (Case I and Case II) Suppose that Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³
0jG®j
jFmj
o
23 and
G® < 0. Then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at ¸ = ¸¤ ´ ·re @re@z + jbj.
As ¸ falls passing through ¸¤, the system with a stable steady state loses
its stability, giving rise to a limit cycle.
(II) (Case III) Suppose that Gz < 0 and 0 < G® < min
n
jFmjjGzj
³0 ;
F®jGmj
jFmj
o
.
Then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at ¸ = ¸¤ ´ ·re @re@z +jbj. As ¸ falls passing
through ¸¤, the system with a stable steady state loses its stability, giving
rise to a limit cycle.
(III) (Case IV) Suppose that G® > 0 and Gz > 0. Then the steady state is
unstable. There exists no limit cycle by way of Hopf bifurcation.
Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the existence of a limit cycle re-
quires at least three conditions: first, the mitigation effect of a high proportion
21¸ is particularly useful for the analysis not only because it is of obvious behavioral im-
portance but also because it provides analytic tractability due to the fact that changes in ¸
do not affect steady state values.
22The proof of Proposition I is found in Appendix A but the proof is concerned about only
the existence of a limit cycle. The computation of the coefficient that shows whether the
limit cycle is stable is very complicated and hard to interpret. Therefore, we extensively use
simulation exercises to observe the stability of cycles.
23Note that Case I automatically satisfies the second condition since Gz < 0 in Case I.
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Figure 4: A Limit Cycle in the Model of Long Waves
of equity holdings on increasing optimism (j·®j) is sufficiently large so that
G® < 024; second, households’ optimistic or pessimistic view on stock markets
is not excessively persistent (Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³
0jG®j
jFmj
o
); third, the rate of loss
of relevance of past events (¸) should not be too large (¸ < ¸¤).25 The second
and third conditions imply that for the existence of a limit cycle, ¸ should be
of appropriate magnitude:
·re
@re
@z
¡min
½
jFmj; ³
0jG®j
jFmj
¾
< ¸ < ·re
@re
@z
+ jbj (38)
All of these conditions imply that to get a limit cycle, households’ portfolio
dynamics should be neither strongly stabilizing nor strongly destabilizing.
One interesting aspect of Part (I) in Proposition I is that the interaction
between two stable subsystems - firms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics
- can generate an unstable steady state and a limit cycle (Case I). Thus, in this
case, the source of the resulting long waves lies purely in the interaction between
both firm and household sectors. Figure 4 depicts the emergence of a limit cycle
24Or the positive effect of changes in ® on z˙ via its effect on the rate of return on equity
should not be too large.
25If ¸ exceeds ¸¤, then the system will be stabilized.
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in this case in a three dimensional space. Figure 5 shows the trajectories of the
debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio in this case.26
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Figure 5: Long Waves
The debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio steadily increase during
a long boom.27 This expansion, however, is followed by a sharp fall in m and
®, which have significant negative impacts on effective demand and trigger an
abrupt downturn in the real sector (See section 4 below).
Part (I) also covers Case II where the subsystem of households’ portfolio
dynamics is unstable. As shown in 3.2, in Case II, portfolio dynamics alone
can create a limit cycle. Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the system
can still have a limit cycle when the portfolio dynamics is combined with firms’
debt dynamics. Then what is the implication of introducing the debt dynamics
into portfolio dynamics? The qualitative analysis does not tell much about
the answer to this question. Numerical experiments, however, provide a case
in which the amplitude and period of long waves get significantly larger as we
26The functions and parameter values for this simulation, which are also used for the sim-
ulation in section 5, are found in Appendix B. A sufficiently long period of time (from t = 0
to t = 30000) is taken in all simulation exercises in this paper.
27Figure 5 (b) shows the steady increase in the equity-deposit ratio during a long expansion.
This implies that firms’ debt/equity ratio steadily falls during a expansion (Note that firms’
stock of debt is always equal to household deposits in this model. Thus, firms’ debt/equity
ratio is given by 1=®.). Minsky often uses the debt/equity ratio to refer to the degree of
indebtedness. The result in this paper, however, shows that rising indebtedness, measured
by the debt-capital ratio (m), is consistent with falling debt-equity ratio (1=®). Interestingly,
Lavoie and Seccareccia (2001) question the empirical relevance of Minsky’s Financial Insta-
bility Hypothesis based on their finding that the debt-equity ratio is not procyclical. The
result of this paper suggests that Minsky’s Instability Hypothesis does not necessarily imply
the procyclical movement of debt-equity ratio.
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move from the 2D subsystem of portfolio dynamics to the full 3D system.
Part (II) in the proposition concerns Case III where the household portfolio
subsystem yields a saddle point steady state. Thus, this part of Proposition 1
shows how stabilizing debt dynamics and households’ portfolio dynamics with
saddle property are combined to produce a limit cycle. Not surprisingly, not
all saddle cases can generate a limit cycle. First, the destabilizing effect that
makes the fixed point in the 2D household subsystem saddle ¡ the magnitude
of G® ¡ should be mild: G® < min
n
jFmjjGzj
³0 ;
F®jGmj
jFmj
o
. Second, Gz should
be negative. If it is positive (Gz > 0), the condition for the saddle point,
G® > 0, eliminates the possibility of the emergence of a limit cycle a la the Hopf
bifurcation. Proposition 1-(III) makes this point. Intuitively, if both G® > 0 and
Gz > 0 (Case IV), the portfolio dynamics in the household sector is excessively
destabilizing in the sense that stabilizing forces in firms’ debt dynamics cannot
contain such a strong destabilizing effect.
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Figure 6: The relationship between the debt-capital ratio and the profit-interest
ratio
To understand the mechanism behind the long waves, it is illuminating to
compare the full system with the subsystem of debt dynamics. As seen in section
3.1, with households’ portfolio composition (®) fixed, the debt-capital ratio (m)
monotonically converges to its steady state value m¤(®). The main reason for
this convergence was the inverse relation between m and ½Trm : a rising debt-
capital ratio deteriorates firms’ profit-interest ratio for any given ®. However,
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once households’ portfolio composition evolves endogenously, this kind of strict
inverse relationship breaks down because changes in ® also affect ½Trm .
Figure 6 illustrates this point, where the horizontal dotted line represents
the threshold level (= ¿¡1(0)) of the profit-interest ratio that makes m˙ zero. In
the area above the horizontal line, the debt-capital ratio increases and in the
area below the line, it decreases. With ® held fixed, the movement along the
curve AB is not possible since for any given ®, a rise in m is incompatible with
a rise in ½Trm . However, increases in ® fueled by households’ optimism during an
expansion have a positive effect on the profit-interest ratio by raising aggregate
demand. Thus, from A to B, the economy experiences increases in both ® and
m.28 However, households’ optimistic views on stock markets eventually fade
as both m and ® increase. As a result, the negative effect of a rise in the debt
ratio starts to be dominant at some point and the profit-interest ratio begins
falling (point B). Because the profit-interest ratio is still above the threshold
level, the debt ratio keeps increasing and the profit-interest ratio falls along
the curve BC. When the profit-interest ratio passes through point C, the debt-
capital ratio starts to fall. When the economy reaches point A, a new cycle
begins.
Figure 7 depicts the same story from a slightly different angle. The solid
line plots a trajectory of the actual debt-capital ratio over time and the dotted
line a trajectory of the desired debt ratio (m¤ ´ m¤(®) in (30)). For a given
value of ®, the debt dynamics, (29), implies that the actual debt ratio m tends
to gravitate toward the desired ratio m¤(®). However, when ® changes, the
desired ratio becomes a moving target of the actual ratio. From this view, a
period of expansion (contraction) is the time when the actual ratio is below
(above) the desired ratio, i.e. m < m¤ (m > m¤) and consequently the actual
debt ratio is increasing (decreasing). In words, a stock market boom (rising ®)
tends to raise the tolerable level of the debt-capital ratio which the actual ratio
is chasing. When the relation between m and m¤ is reversed, a long downturn
begins (See point C in Figure 7).
4. A Model of Short Cycles
The model of long waves in section 3.3 can be combined with a model of
short cycles. In our analysis of long waves, the degree of capacity utilization
is set at its long run average. However, when it comes to short cycles, the
28The positive effect of the rise in ® on the profit-interest ratio dominates the negative effect
of the rise in m and consequently the profit-interest ratio also increases during this period.
24
mm
?
Expansion m ? m?
Contraction m ? m?
t
m,m
?
A
B
D
C
Figure 7: Actual and Desired Debt Ratios
utilization rate can deviate from the desired rate due to falsified demand expec-
tations and slow adjustment of capital stocks. Thus, we use equation (9) for our
analysis of short cycles. In 2.4, using this accumulation function (9) and the
consumption function (12), we derived the profit share that ensures the goods
market equilibrium, which depends positively on u, m, and ®. (See (24))
Regarding firms’ pricing/output decisions, this paper adopts a Marshallian
approach elaborated in Skott (1989). The Keynesian literature often assumes
that prices are sticky while output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to
absorb demand shocks but the Marshallian approach assumes the opposite.
Output does not adjust instantaneously due to a production lag and substantial
adjustment costs.29 In this framework, fast adjustments in prices and the profit
share establish product market equilibrium for a given level of output. In a
continuous-time setting, sluggish output adjustment can be approximated by
assuming that output is predetermined at each moment and that firms choose
the rate of growth of output, rather than the level of output. Then output
growth is determined by comparing the costs and benefits involved in the output
29For instance, increases in production and employment require substantial search, hiring
and training costs. Hiring or layout costs include not only explicit costs but also hidden costs
such as a deterioration in industrial relations and morale.
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adjustment which in turn are determined by the labor market conditions and
the profit signal in the goods market, respectively. Thus we can formulate:
Yˆ = h(¼; e); h¼ > 0; he < 0 (39)
where e is the employment rate. A higher profitability induces firms to expand
output more rapidly whereas the tightened labor market gives firms negative
incentives to expand production.30 Assuming a fixed-coefficient Leontief tech-
nology, Y = minf¾K; ºLg, the employment rate can be expressed as: e = Y=º
L¯
,
where º is constant labor productivity and L¯ is available labor force which
exponentially grows at a constant natural rate n. From this definition,
eˆ = Yˆ ¡ n (40)
The definition of u yields:
uˆ = Yˆ ¡ Kˆ (41)
Putting together (9), (24), (39), (40) and (41), we get the following system of
short cycles.
uˆ = h(¼(u
+
;m
+
; ®
+
); e¡)¡ Á(u+) (42)
eˆ = h(¼(u
+
;m
+
; ®
+
); e¡)¡ n (43)
When m and ® are fixed, the system of (42) and (43) exhibits essentially the
same dynamic properties as Skott (1989). As Skott shows, under plausible
assumptions, the system of (42) and (43) ensures the existence of a steady
growth equilibrium and the steady state is locally asymptotically unstable unless
the negative effect of employment on output expansion is implausibly large.
Once the boundedness of the trajectories is proved, the system (42) and (43)
will generate a limit cycle a la the Poincare-Bendixson theorem (See Skott 1989,
Appendix 6C for the proof).
5. Putting all together: Long Waves and Short Cycles
This section puts all elements together in order to integrate long waves with
short cycles and presents our simulation results.31 Our full model of long waves
and short cycles is a five dimensional dynamical system that consists of (12),
30For more details about the behavioral foundation of (39), see Skott (1989, Ch.4).
31Parameter values and functions used for this simulation are available in Appendix B. The
simulation in this section is based on Case I in Table 1. Simulation results in other cases are
available upon request.
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(29), (32), (42), and (43). We have seen that (12), (29), and (32) provide a model
of long waves, whereas (42) and (43) generate a mechanism of short cycles.32
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Figure 8: Comparison
As seen in section 4, if m and ® are fixed, (42) and (43) produce a limit
cycle under plausible conditions. It can be shown that the resulting limit cycle
exhibits a clockwise movement on the e-u space, or alternatively, the e-¼ space.
Figure 8 (a) presents an example of the limit cycle on the e-¼ space. The sys-
tem of (12), (29) and (32), however, generates long waves of the debt-capital
ratio (m) and the equity-deposit ratio (®), which are represented in Figure 5.
As m and ® change endogenously, the limit cycle in Figure 8 (a) breaks down
and the clockwise movement of e and ¼ spirals up to the northeast or down
to the southwest, depending on the direction of changes in m and ®. Figure 8
(b) illustrates this. The upward spiral from A to B represents a long expan-
sion driven by increases in the debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio,
whereas the downward spiral from B to A an economic downturn prompted by
sharp decreases in m and ®.
During each long expansion, the profit share exhibits a strong upward move-
ment with mild cyclical fluctuations around the trend (Figure 9 (a)). The similar
32By using (26) as our definition of trend profitability based on u = u¤, the system of long
waves becomes independent of that of short cycles, while the latter depends on the former.
This kind of unilateral dependence can be relaxed by adopting an alternative formulation
of trend profitability, without affecting the qualitative results. For instance, we can use a
weighted moving average of current profit rates as a measure of the trend rate of profit (See
Appendix C).
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Figure 9: Simulation Paths I
pattern characterizes the movements in the profit rates (Figure 9 (b)). During
crises, the rate of profit net of depreciation and interest payment (¼u¾¡±¡rm)
tumbles even to negative rates. A change in the debt structure have large im-
pacts on the real sector performance through its effect on the profitability. This
is prominently shown in the behavior of the employment rate (Figure 9 (c)).
Figure 9 (d) depicts a trajectory of the rate of return on equity. During long
booms, the rate of return on equity is strong and sound on average but during
crises, it suddenly drops to significantly negative rates.
Figure 10 (b) shows the growth rate of output where the Hodrick-Prescott
filtered trend is added.33 A financial sector induced crisis triggers a deep re-
cession in the real sector which is reflected in the negative growth rates during
33The filtered series is only for illustrative purpose since it simply smoothes the original
series and it does not adequately capture asymmetric features and structural breaks in the
original series.
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Figure 10: Simulation Paths II
periodic deep downturns. Capacity utilization and capital accumulation follow
the pattern similar to that of output growth(Figure 10 (a) and (c)). Figure
10 (d), finally, plot the ratio of consumption to household income. The series
follows the basic long waves/short cycles patten as shown in the profit share
and the employment rate but the movement in the consumption/income ratio
is noticeably smooth compared to other simulated series.34
6. Conclusion
The U.S. economy is going through a deep recession triggered by the biggest
financial crisis since the Great Depression. A Minskian perspective suggests
34The long run behavior of consumption is closely related to the movement in house-
hold net worth to income ratio: C
YH
= c1Y
H+c2NW
H
YH
= c1 + c2
NWH
YH
where NW
H
YH
=
(1+®)m
u¾¡sf (¼u¾¡±¡rm) .
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that the explanation of this crisis should be found in endogenous changes in
financial fragility.
This study has modeled a Minskian theory of long waves. The model clarifies
the underlying mechanism of endogenous changes in financial fragility and the
interaction between real and financial sectors. At a theoretical level, the study
provides a promising way of integrating two types of instability principles: Min-
sky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and Harrod’s Instability Principle. While
both principles provide a source of cycles, they have distinct frequencies and
amplitudes in this model. The Minskian instability hypothesis creates long
waves and the Harrodian instability principle produces short cycles. The limit
to the upward trend created by Minskian instability is imposed by financial cri-
sis, while explosive trajectories implied by Harrodian instability are contained
by stabilizing labor market dynamics.35 When two principles are combined into
a coherent stock-flow consistent framework, the proposed pattern of long waves
and short cycles emerges.
A purely mathematical model of this kind may clarify the logic of interactions
but clearly has many limitations. The depth of the current crisis and the time
needed to initiate a new cycle depend on institutional and policy dimensions.
Minsky devotes a large part of his analysis to the institutional and historical
developments of financial markets and policy responses. Thus, the patterns of
long waves are heavily affected by these elements. The full account of long waves
and crises is possible only when one takes a serious look at these dimensions.
Disregarding the historical contingencies of actual movements, it may be
useful to extend the model in a number of directions. First, it may be desirable
to explicitly treat the banking sector as an active profit-seeking unit. Bankers’
perception of tranquility, possibly affected by their own profitability, may not
always agree with those of the firm and household sectors.36 Next, this paper
did not explore the implications of households’ indebtedness. Instead, it has
focused on an increasing share of stocks (riskier asset) in households’ financial
wealth as an indicator of increasing fragility in the household sector. It would
be interesting to see the effect of the introduction of the evolution of household
35The following quote from Minsky (1995, 84) is suggestive: “As reasonable values of the
parameters of the endogenous interactions lead to an explosive endogenous process, and as
explosive expansions and contractions rarely occur, then constraints by devices such as the
relative inelasticity of finance or an inelastic labor supply need to be imposed and be effective
in generating what actually happens.”
36Setterfield (2004) assumes that the private sector (the aggregate of firm and household
sectors) and the banking sector have different fragility functions but does not try to justify
the assumed shapes of those functions.
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debt into the model.37 Third, the proposed model is inflation neutral in the
sense that the decisions on real quantities such as investment, consumption and
output expansion are made with no reference to inflation and the banking sector
holds the real interest rate at a constant level. In some account of Minskian ideas
(e.g see Fazzari et al., 2008), changes in the inflation rate play an important
role. Finally, the assumption of a closed economy in this paper is another major
limitation. Unfettered international capital flows, in contrast to the belief of
its proponents, have created growing instability and global imbalances (Blecker,
1999). Several authors suggest that Minsky’s theory can be extended to an
international context (e.g. Wolfson, 2002), but few attempt has been made to
formalize the ideas and to propose precise mechanisms behind them. Addressing
these issues is left for future research.
37To introduce this aspect, the model may have to be extended to allow heterogeneity among
households as long as the household sector as a whole is in a net credit position.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the existence of a limit cycle for the system of (12), (29), and (32),
we need to show that the Jacobian matrix (35) evaluated at (m(¸), ®(¸), z(¸),
¸), where (m(¸), ®(¸), z(¸)) is a fixed point of the system,38 should have the
following properties:
² The Jacobian matrix has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues ¯(¸)§
µ(¸)i such that ¯(¸¤) = 0, µ(¸¤) 6= 0, and ¯0(¸¤) 6= 0 and no other
eigenvalues with zero real part exist at (m(¸¤), ®(¸¤), z(¸¤) , ¸¤)
where ¸¤ is a Hopf bifurcation point.
To apply the above condition for the Hopf bifurcation to the current context,
I will use the fact that the Jacobian matrix will have a negative real root and a
pair of pure imaginary roots if and only if:
(R1) Tr(J) = Fm +Gz < 0
(R2) J1 + J2 + J3 = FmGz ¡ ³ 0 ¢G® > 0
(R3) Det(J) = ¡³ 0 ¢ (FmG® ¡ F®Gm) < 0
(R4) ¡Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3) + Det(J) = ¡(Fm + Gz)(FmGz ¡ ³ 0 ¢ G®) ¡ ³ 0 ¢
(FmG® ¡ F®Gm) = 0
Let us denote the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix as ¹(¸) and ¯(¸)§µ(¸)i.
Proof of (I). Suppose that G® < 0. Then (R3) is always met. In order
to satisfy (R1) and (R2), we should have Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³
0jG®j
jFmj
o
. (R4) is
quadratic in Gz. (R4) can be rewritten as:
a1G2z + a2Gz + a3 = 0 (A1)
where
a1 ´ ¡Fm > 0
a2 ´ ¡(F2m ¡ ³ 0G®) S 0
a3 ´ ³ 0F®Gm < 0
Solving (A1) for Gz, we obtain one negative and one positive real roots. Let
us select the negative root39, which is given as:
38Note that in our case the fixed point is independent of the value of ¸.
39It can be shown that the positive root is irrelevant for the analysis.
36
b ´ (jFmj
2 ¡ ³ 0G®)¡
p
(jFmj2 ¡ ³ 0G®)2 + 4³ 0jFmjjGmjF®
2jFmj < 0 (A2)
Since Gz = ·re @r
e
@z ¡¸, the value of ¸ that satisfies (R4) is: ¸ = ·re @r
e
@z + jbj. Let
¸¤ ´ ·re @re@z + jbj. We have shown that if Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³
0jG®j
jFmj
o
and ¸ = ¸¤,
then the Jacobian matrix has a negative real root and a pair of imaginary roots:
¹(¸¤) < 0, ¯(¸¤) = 0, and µ(¸¤) 6= 0. To prove ¸¤ is indeed the bifurcation
point, we still need to show that ¯0(¸¤) 6= 0. To prove ¯0(¸¤) 6= 0, let us use the
following fact:
¹(¸) + 2¯(¸) = Fm +Gz
2¹(¸)¯(¸) + ¯(¸)2 + µ(¸)2 = FmGz ¡ ³ 0 ¢G®
¹(¸)[¯(¸)2 + µ(¸)2] = ¡³ 0 ¢ (FmG® ¡ F®Gm)
Totally differentiating both sides with respect to ¸, we get264 1 2 02¯(¸) 2[¹(¸) + ¯(¸)] 2µ(¸)
[¯(¸)2 + µ(¸)2] 2¹(¸)¯(¸) 2¹(¸)µ(¸)
375
264¹0(¸)¯0(¸)
µ0(¸)
375 =
264 ¡1jFmj
0
375 (A3)
The right hand side of (A3) is obtained using the fact that @Gz@¸ = ¡1 and ¸
does not affect all other partial derivatives than Gz. Evaluating (A3) at ¸ = ¸¤,
we have: 264 1 2 00 2¹(¸¤) 2µ(¸¤)
µ(¸¤)2 0 2¹(¸¤)µ(¸¤)
375
264¹0(¸¤)¯0(¸¤)
µ0(¸¤)
375 =
264 ¡1jFmj
0
375
Solving this for ¯0(¸¤), we finally get:
¯0(¸¤) =
2¹(¸¤)µ(¸¤)jFmj ¡ 2µ(¸¤)3
4¹(¸¤)2µ(¸¤) + 4µ(¸¤)3
< 0 since ¹(¸¤) < 0
Thus, ¯0(¸¤) is strictly negative.
Proof of (II). Suppose that G® > 0 and Gz < 0. Then (R1) is always
satisfied. To meet (R2) and (R3), we need G® < min
n
jFmjjGzj
³0 ;
F®jGmj
jFmj
o
. The
rest of the proof is essentially the same as that of (I).
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Proof of (III). Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient conditions for the local
stability of a three dimensional system are (R1), (R2) and (R3) with replacing
the equality in (R4) by the inequality: ¡Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3) + Det(J) > 0.
Suppose that G® > 0 and Gz > 0. Then (R2) is always violated and the fixed
point is unstable. At the same time, since (R2) is not met, it is impossible to
get a limit cycle a la the Hopf bifurcation.
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Appendix B: Functions and Parameter Values in Simulation
g = °0 + °1u (B1)
I
K
= g + ± (B2)
Yˆ = h(¼; e) = h0 +
h1
1 + exp[¡h2(¼ + h3 ln(h4 ¡ e) + h5))] (B3)
m˙ = ¿
³ ½T
rm
´
= ¿0 +
¿1 ¡ ¿0
1 + exp[¡¿2
¡
½T
rm ¡ ¿3
¢
]
(B4)
where ½T = ¼(u¤;m; ®)u¤¾ and u¤ =
1
°1
(n¡ °0)
®˙ = ³(z) = ³0 +
³1 ¡ ³0
1 + exp[¡³2(z ¡ ³3)] (B5)
z˙ = · (reju=u¤ ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z = ·0 + ·1(reju=u¤ ¡ r)¡ ·2®¡ ¸z (B6)
where reju=u¤ = ½T ¡ ± ¡ rm+ (1 + ®)(m˙+mn) + ®˙m¡ n
®m
:
Table 2: Parameter Values
°0 °1 h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 ¾
-0.93 1.2 -0.02 0.07 50 0.4 1.1 0.423 0.5
n ± sf r c1 c2 ·0 ·1 ·2
0.03 0.09 0.7 0.03 0.65 0.04 0.093 0.03 0.08
¸ ³0 ³1 ³2 ³3 ¿0 ¿1 ¿2 ¿3
0.04 -0.24 0.03 30 -0.069 -0.135 0.01 20 10.4
Appendix C: Alternative Measure of the Trend Rate of Profit
A weighed moving average specification may provide an alternative measure
of the trend rate of profit:
½T =
Z t
¡1
´ exp [¡´(t¡ º)]½ºdº where ¹ > 0 (C1)
where ½º is the current rate of profit at each moment of time º 2 (¡1; t] and
´ exp [¡´(t¡ º)] represents the weight attached to ½º in the calculation of the
39
trend rate of profit at time t, which exponetially decreases as º gets futhur back
to the past. This specification implies that the trend profit rate is constantly
updated based on the following averaging process.
½˙T = ´(½¡ ½T )
where ½ = ¼(u;m; ®)u¾. Note that the expression for the current profit rate ½
includes capicity utilization (u) as well as the debt ratio (m) and the equity-
deposit ratio (®). Thus, the system of short cycles and that of long waves
become interdependent.
The two specifications, (26) and (C1), produce qualitatively similar results.
The basic idea behind both specifications is to smooth actual profitability and
get a measure of the long-run trend of profitability and one would expect the
two specifications to produce qualitatively similar results. Simulations confirm
that this is indeed the case (Simulation results based on (C1) is available upon
request.) Analytically, the specification (26) is more tractable and the analysis
in this paper has been based on (26).
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